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Introduction  
 
Like much of my work, and in a way that is (I hope) in tune with the philosophy 
of Geography at Roskilde University, this paper has a local, but not a 
parochial, beginning and an emancipatory intent. Its starting point is the on-
going debate about whether there should be devolved regional government 
and new elected Regional Assemblies in England, and particularly the north 
east of England (se ODPM, 2004a). During the 1980s voices began to be 
raised arguing for constitutional reform, decentralising some power to elected 
regional assemblies, as a way of tackling more effectively problems of 
unemployment, inequality and poverty in the region (Byrne, 1990). Since 
1997, the ‘New Labour’ government has promoted the concept of regional 
devolution, leading to the creation of an unelected Regional Assembly in the 
north east. In 2002 the government 2002 White Paper Your Region, Your 
Choice: Revitalising the English Regions brought the prospect of elected 
Regional Assemblies to those English Regions that wanted them. As in many 
other instances over the last sixty years, the north east was to be the 
laboratory in which this experiment in a new form of regional policy was to be 
first conducted.  The contemporary case for a Regional Assembly in the north 
east has been informed by a variety of arguments, many of which are shared 
by Cabinet Ministers and powerful political voices within the north east. They 
may be summarised as follows.  
 
First, that the north east has lost out in the competition for inward investment 
and associated new employment. The region has been disadvantaged in the 
global competition for investment and jobs as a result of its lack of devolved 
powers and regional autonomy. Specifically within the UK, this has been 
especially so relative to Scotland and Wales, which have both had their own 
Development Agencies since 1975 and more recently, a Scottish Parliament 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of a paper first prepared for the 30th Anniversary Conference of the 
Establishment of the Geography Institute, Roskilde University , “Geographies of Power, the 
Power of Geography”, Roskilde, October 26, 2004. I am also grateful to Joe Painter for 
constructive comments on an earlier draft, some of which are acknowledged explicitly below.  
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and a Welsh Assembly, respectively. More recently, the north east, along with 
the other English Regions, has from 1999 had its own Regional Development 
Agency, ONE NorthEast, but this is seen as weak and lacking democratic 
accountability, political legitimacy, financial resources and powers relative to 
those of Scotland and Wales. Secondly, that those regions in the late modern 
world of the European Union that have been successful in making the 
transition to a ‘high road’ of economic development, such as Baden-
Württemberg and those of the Third Italy, are characterised by devolved forms 
of governance and regulation and this is seen as causally related to their 
economic success. Thirdly, that existing forms of ‘top down’ regional 
economic policy had manifestly failed, with important effects regionally and 
nationally. This failure helped in opening up space for alternative issues to be 
put on the regional political agenda, including that of regional devolution. The 
continuing poor performance of peripheral regional economies is seen as a 
major reason as to why national productivity lags behind that of major 
competitors such as the USA. Echoing arguments form the 1950s, the 
perceived solution to this national problem is to enhance productivity in 
peripheral regions such as the north east and regional devolution is seen as 
the way to achieve this. This chimes with the arguments of those within the 
north east who favour devolution and an elected Regional Assembly. Finally, 
it was also claimed that devolution would also bring benefits in terms of new 
forms of participative democracy, greater political accountability and 
transparency in the policy making process within the region. An elected 
Regional Assembly would eliminate the democratic deficit created by its 
unelected predecessor. Indeed, it is claimed by the Government that 
devolution would bring a new style of politics, centred on partnership and 
stakeholder engagement. 
 
In short, then, in several respects, the claims made for the positive aspects of 
regional devolution to the north east can be seen as an exemplar of broader 
tendencies and as legitimated by claims about those same tendencies. In 
particular the claim that political devolution of power to peripheral regions can 
be a sufficient and not simply a necessary condition for greater regional 
economic prosperity is one of central significance (although many 
economically successful regions do not have devolved regional government). 
Conversely, such arguments for greater regional devolution find a particular 
resonance in the north east, perhaps more so than in any other English 
region, because there is a long history of cross-class collaborative projects, 
extending back to the 1930s, that have sought to define and promote ‘the 
regional interest’ – albeit without significantly altering the region’s position at 
the foot of the league table of economic performance in England.  
 
In this paper I critically examine the origins of this belief – or as I will argue, 
enabling myth (Dugger, 2001) - that regional devolution and regional 
economic success are necessarily related in some causal sense and examine 
the validity of the claims being made for devolution to English regions. 
Enabling myths lead to particular ideas becoming hegemonic and doxic, 
taken-for-granted, unquestioned determinants of everyday behaviour 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Gramsci, 1971). The proposition that regional devolution in 
and of itself will lead to economic success has become deeply embedded in 
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beliefs and policy discourses about the determinants of regional prosperity 
and in turn has lead to arguments for such devolution. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. First, there are a few 
introductory comments on concepts of power, regions, the reorganisation of 
the state and concepts of multi-level governance, and governmentality, which 
can be used to help understand the issues surrounding regional devolution. 
Then I examine the ways in which north east England was politically and 
socially constructed as a particular type of region, with specific problems, in 
the 1930s – a move that had lasting significance to the present day in creating 
some foundational enabling myths about regional devolution. Moving on some 
six decades, I then examine some contemporary enabling myths about the 
relationship between regional devolution and regional success, which find 
fertile ground in the north east precisely because of its long history of 
representation as a region with a unified regional interest.  I then briefly reflect 
on the process of regional devolution in light of the concepts outlined in 
section two of the paper, critically appraising the validity of their claims vis a 
vis regional economic regeneration. A brief conclusion follows.  
 
 
Conceptual groundings  
 
Concepts of power  
 
While this is not the place for a thorough review of the literature on power (not 
least, for reasons of length), nonetheless a few comments are necessary by 
way of introduction. Drawing on the work of Allen (1997, 2003), broadly 
speaking, three concepts of power can be identified – all of which Allen 
regards as inadequate in some way – and which I prefer to see as alternative 
perspectives rather than either/or options. These varying conceptions stress 
different aspects of power and the processes through which it is constituted 
and produced. They provide conceptual tools through which issues of regional 
devolution and the devolution of power to the regions can be interpreted.  
 
The first conception, drawing on critical realism, is a ‘centred’ one of power as 
an inscribed capacity of individuals or institutions – inscribed in the sense that 
power is something that is possessed by virtue of their constitutive social 
relationships. It is located: that is, centred in agencies (individuals or 
organisations) as a consequence of the very structure of their constitutive 
causal relationships.  As a result, these varied agencies come to posses 
specific capacities that allow them to seek to secure desired outcomes.  
 
However, possession is not synonomous with the exercise of power. The 
capacity to exercise power and dominate  - that is, to control, to command or 
to direct the actions of others - is only realised contingently, under specific 
circumstances and conditions. Thus the ability to maintain power relations is 
inherently problematic, precisely because contexts and places are multiple 
and varied. For example, the state can been seen as possessing power as a 
consequence of its relationship to the social relations of capital and the 
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necessity that it has a degree of relative autonomy from other social agents 
and classes.  
 
Equating power with domination emphasises the asymmetric relationship 
between those involved in power relations. Those exercising power can exert 
‘power over’ those subject to the exercise of that power. As a result, outcomes 
are inherently unequal, with ‘winners’ gaining at the expense of ‘losers’. In this 
sense, this conception of power tends to conceive power relationships as 
zero-sum games, with only a fixed amount of power (and resources) in play. 
Whether the assumption of a fixed ‘lump of power’ is a necessary one in 
accounts informed by critical realism remains a moot point, however.  
 
The second conception of power is a ‘networked’ conception, which sees 
power as a medium. Power is conceived as a resource for achieving diverse 
ends, emphasising ‘power to’ rather than ‘power over’, and how power is 
generated to achieve desired outcomes rather than how power constrains 
action. Power is not inherent in social relationships but, in contrast, is 
produced via mobilising resources to achieve particular goals. This networked 
conception of power, with networks criss-crossing and overlapping, also 
raises the possibility that power is a fluid medium, variable in amount 
depending on context rather than a fixed quantity. It suggests that the power 
of all those enrolled in a network can be increased via their participation in the 
network relative to non-participants, at least for as long as they remain 
members of the network. Whether all participants increase their power equally 
is another matter, however. In this view, for example, the state develops 
power to act via the relationships and alliances that it forges with other social 
actors or stakeholders. 
 
The third conception of power is a diagrammatic and Foucauldian one of 
power as a technology that works on subjects. Power is essentially conceived 
as a series of strategies, techniques and practices, something that is 
exercised though groups or organisations rather than held or possessed or 
centred in them. The key issue is that of the techniques through which the 
conduct of others is moulded and their range of actions limited and processes 
of governing enacted ‘at a distance’. Thus power is seen as ‘productive’ as 
people are subjectively constituted via routinised and ritualised practices 
etched in disciplinary modes of power that have a hegemonic, unquestioned 
existence.  
 
In developing his strategic–relation theory of the state, Jessop draws together 
neo-Gramscian ideas as to how hegemonic practices are channelled through 
complex ensembles of institutions dispersed throughout civil society with 
Foucault’s “capillary” notion of power in theorising the mechanisms of state 
power and knowledge and in seeking to account for how state power is 
developed and deployed. This is a view of power as fluid and relational, 
exercised from innumerable points within civil society, the economy and the 
state, so that many agencies and institutions are involved within productive 
networks of power. The Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge and concept 
of power as ‘fluid and relational’ emphasises state/civil society relations in 
systems of governing. The focus is not upon who has power or the right to 
 4
Regional devolution and regional economic success …draft 8 
 
know/not know (that is, on a search for a single universal locus of power) but 
upon ‘matrices of transformation’ and the complex diffusion and inter-relation 
of power throughout society. Nonetheless, Foucault privileged the role of the 
state (the “macro-physics of power”) as “the point of strategic codification of 
the multitude of power relations (“the micro-physics of power”) and the 
apparatus in which hegemony, meta-power, class domination and ‘sur 
pouvoir’ are organised” (Jessop, 1990, 239).  
 
Concepts of regions  
 
Essentialist conceptions of regions are no longer regarded as intellectually 
tenable. Regions must be understood as socially constructed – both 
discursively and materially - although political actors and particular interest 
groups may seek to define and defend them in essentialist terms and it is 
important to understand why this is so, not least in relation to argument about 
regional devolution.  This is the case in two respects: first, the constructions of 
regions as objects of policy; secondly, the construction of regions as subjects 
of policy and issues such as who claims the right to speak for the region, to 
define the region and its interests, prioritising some interests over others. As 
Councillor Bob Gibson, Vice Chair of the North East Assembly put it in 
September 2002: “The North East has a clear identity, geographically, 
culturally and historically. Of course there is much diversity within the region 
…[b]ut where necessary the region can come together and speak with one 
voice” (cited in Snapshot, September 2002). 
 
Two principles have informed the recent re-thinking of the region (Allen et. al, 
1998, 1-4). First, it is grounded in a strongly relational approach. Regions are 
seen as constituted out of spatialized social relations, “stretched out” over 
space and materialised in various form, and representational narratives about 
them. The spatiality of the dynamics of capitalism, the mechanisms of growth 
and decline, their uneven geographies and the stories told about them, 
represent one way of conceptualising the processes underlying the 
(re)construction of regions. Regions can be seen as products of complex 
condensations of social relationships, of varying density and variety. Such 
relationships come together contingently in specific time/space combinations 
to produce what are, in the last analysis, “unique regions”. The simultaneous 
combined and uneven development of particular regions reflects their shifting 
engagement with mechanisms of growth and decline as these are stretched 
over space in the flux of real historical time (Harvey, 1982). 
 
Second, regions only exist in relation to particular criteria. They are not ‘out 
there’ waiting to be discovered. This therefore provides a way of thinking that 
discloses a region which is by no means necessarily a “whole”, with all the 
characteristics of coherence which that term implies; nor is it necessarily a 
bounded and closed entity. Thinking about a region in terms of “stretched out” 
social relationships reveals a complex and unbounded lattice of articulations 
constructed through and around relations of power and inequality. It is a 
discontinuous lattice, punctured by structured exclusions, with intra-regional 
variation “because of the uneven nature of the overlay of different [defining] 
criteria” (Allen et al., 1998, 55-6). Each relational network has its own spatial 
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reach, and the spatial reaches may not be coincident, although they may 
mutually influence one another. Intra-regional heterogeneity and discontinuity 
implies that, metaphorically, the fabric of regions is torn and ragged. 
Consequently, the issue is not how and whether to draw lines around regions 
but to seek to understand the processes through which they are (re)produced 
- though this cannot be divorced from questions of how the variable geometry 
of regions in space and time is conceptualised (Hudson, 1990).  
 
Allen et al. (1998, 143) argue that an adequate understanding of regions can 
“only” (my emphasis) come through a conception of them as open, 
discontinuous, relational and internally diverse. While many regions may be 
now more open, less bounded and more interconnected than they once were, 
they have always had these characteristics to some degree. There have 
always been connections in various ways to a wider world, as regions have 
never been entirely closed, especially since the onset of industrial capitalism. 
Furthermore, on average, the frequency, intensity and spatial reach of such 
connections have tended to increase as the social relationships of capitalism 
have become more stretched and re-defined spaces in new ways, especially 
with the intensification of time-space compression in recent years. However, 
the density and geography of linkages can decline as well as increase in 
particular regions – for example, as a result of devalorisation and 
disinvestment decisions by transnational companies or political decisions to 
seek a greater degree of closure within a region. Indeed, political decisions to 
seek a greater degree of closure may follow precisely because of the 
character of extra-regional relations, linkages and distanciated networked 
relationships.  
 
In short, many of the social relations that help constitute all regions traverse 
their immanent boundaries and enrol extra-regional actors in the process of 
regionalisation but the effect of these trans-boundary relationships may, in 
some cases, produce what may be termed “closure”2. However, the degree to 
which regions are closed, continuous and bounded or open, discontinuous 
and permeable is best regarded as a matter to be resolved ex post and 
empirically rather than a priori and theoretically. Moreover, and critically in the 
context of debates about regional devolution, social and political actors often 
seek to represent regions as closed, continuous and internally homogeneous 
and, as such, legitimate subjects seeking to shape policy, and it is important 
to understand why this is so. 
      
Concepts of the reorganisation of the state and scalar shifts in modes 
on governing 
 
Drawing especially on recent changes in the European Union, Jessop (1997) 
refers to the “reorganisation” of the state as a triple process of de-nationalisation 
(hollowing out), de-statisation of the political system and the internationalisation 
of policy régimes. The extent to which regulation is carried out at sub-national 
                                                 
2 This is a slightly different, but more nuanced, interpretation of the links between ‘openness’ 
and ‘closure’ than I have previously argued (for example, see Hudson, 2001, Chapter 8) and I 
a extremely grateful to Joe Painter for providing it and emphasising that territoriality can be 
the effect of certain kinds of networked relationships.  
 6
Regional devolution and regional economic success …draft 8 
 
and supra-national scales is related to pressures on the national state form 
"from above" and “from below” and it is the latter that are of particular relevance 
in the context of debates about devolution to regions. Such pressures "from 
below" are generated because of regionalist and nationalist movements, 
informed by complex mixtures of cultural, economic and political motives that 
combine to form pressures for more powerful sub-national spaces of 
governance and regulation within the boundaries of national states. 
Economically advanced regions seek increased autonomy to reduce fiscal 
transfers to less successful regions (as in Catalunya in Spain and the movement 
to establish “Padania” in northern Italy). Economically disadvantaged regions 
such as north east England seek greater autonomy precisely because central 
state regional policies have failed to improve their economic well-being (as in 
Corsica and Scotland). Such separatist pressures become most powerful when 
economic motives combine with a sense of political oppression of culturally 
“suppressed nations” (as in Quebec or in the Basque country in northern Spain) 
and the boundaries defined by the economic and the cultural are seen to 
coalesce. However, national states are not innocent and passive by-standers in 
these processes of territorial decentralisation of power and/or responsibilities. 
For example, states may seek to preserve the integrity of their national territory 
via granting increased autonomy to regions within their boundaries or seek to 
contain fiscal crises by devolving responsibility (but not commensurate 
resources) for economic development to regions.  
 
These varied pressures have reinforced tendencies to shift regulatory practices 
from the national level and so bring about qualitative changes in relationships 
between national and regional levels. It is, however, important not to overstate 
the extent of such changes. There is a long-established sub-national territorial 
structure to state power in response to requirements for administrative efficiency 
and political legitimacy. Increasingly, however, there have also been pressures 
further to shift the power to shape policies for regions to the regional level. This 
involves a decentralisation of the power to decide and resources to implement 
decisions rather than regions simply administering central government policies, 
which is intended to produce a greater correspondence between administrative 
spaces and the meaningful spaces of the regional life world. As a result, more 
complex architectures of political power and spaces of governance and 
regulation have emerged. 
 
As well as scalar shifts, there has been a change in emphasis from government 
to governance in systems of governing. Regulatory capacities have been shifted 
"outwards" to non-state organisations with enhanced significance placed upon 
social practices beyond the state. A range of organisations and institutions 
within civil society has been incorporated into processes of governance. This 
has been particularly associated with the promotion of network concepts and 
networked forms of regional governance (Hadimichalis and Hudson, 2003). The 
growing emphasis on governance is recognition of the increasing importance - 
or perhaps more accurately is increasing recognition of the importance - of the 
institutions of civil society in securing the conditions under which the economy is 
possible. It acknowledges the social constitution of the economy, the embedding 
of the economy in cultural and political traditions and arrangements. 
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In summary, the reorganisation of the national state involves moving regulatory 
capacities between scales within state structures and outwards from the state 
into the institutions of civil societies and back into the economic institutions of 
markets. The concept of reorganisation denotes the emergence of new, more 
complicated structures of governing, involving re-defined relations between 
economy, society and state and complex links within multi-scalar systems of 
governing. However, this does not resolve the problems stemming from crisis 
tendencies in state activity but transposes them to different spatial scales and 
into civil society. Moreover, national states retain a key role as “scale 
managers”, shaping decisions about scalar shifts in regulatory capacity, serving 
as centres of persuasion and authors of narratives about change and reform 
and centres of interpretation and dissemination of knowledge about experiences 
elsewhere (Peck, 2003, 357).  The critical issue is not the demise but the 
character of the national state, the type of regulatory régime that it maintains, 
the geometry of that régime and the extent to which it involves devolution to the 
regional scale, and the form of capitalist economy that it seeks to encourage.  
 
Concepts of governmentality  
 
The Foucauldian concept of ‘governmentality’ is helpful in further 
understanding the processes of reorganisation  of the state and the attempts 
to create the region as a political subject and the regional as a new scale of 
governing. While the emphasis on the national as the dominant space and 
spatial scale of regulation can be seen as expressive of one governmentality, 
the shift to concepts of multi-level governance and of re-defined boundaries 
between economy, civil society and state in the processes of governing can 
be seen as both indicative and constitutive of another governmentality. Not 
least, the spatial object of policy and the spaces of governance are seen to 
encompass more than just the national.  
 
Drawing on Dean (1999, 11-16) government can be defined as “any more or 
less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities 
and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that 
seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests 
and beliefs, for definite and shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively 
unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes”. A mentality might be 
described as “a condition of forms of thought and is thus not amenable to be 
comprehended from within its own perspective. The idea of mentalities, then 
emphasises the way in which the thought involved in the practices of 
government is collective and relatively taken-for-granted, that is, is not usually 
open to questioning by its practitioners'’.  There are clear similarities to the 
doxic qualities of Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus and Gramsci’s (1971) 
concept of hegemony.  
 
Bringing ‘government’ and ‘mentality’ together, governmentality emphasises 
the unthinking practices and the “how” questions, rather than the “why” 
questions and the structures of government and governing. Governmentality 
“is intrinsically linked to the activities of expertise, whose role is not one of 
weaving an all-pervasive web of ‘social control’, but of enacting assorted 
attempts at the calculated administration of diverse aspects of conduct 
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through the countless, often competing, local tactics of education, persuasion, 
inducement, management, incitement, motivation and encouragement” 
(MacKinnon, 2000, 296). However, an unintended consequence of 
concentrations of expert knowledge is that this can give rise to “enclosures”, 
tightly bound sites of vigorously defended professional expertise, resistant to 
the wishes of government (Rose and Miller, 1992, 190). Moreover, such 
activities are territorially-demarcated. Space is an important element of 
governmentality because “to govern it is necessary to render visible the space 
over which government is to be exercised. And this is not simply a matter of 
looking: space has to be re-presented, marked out” (Thrift, 2002, 205). This 
emphasises the way in which regions need to be defined, represented and 
marked out, as both objects and subjects of governing.  
 
This thereby locates the space of the region as one element in wider circuits 
of power and regards the specific activities of those acting as or for the region 
as themselves to be explained  - the black box of the region must be opened 
up to explain how it can achieve coherence and perform as a political subject.  
The creation of such internal coherence and a regional bloc can only be 
achieved through the successful realisation of specific regional projects that 
unite diverse social actors around a distinct line of action. However, achieving 
such unity is always a contingent matter. Even if it is achieved, however, there 
is no guarantee that such projects will always and only have their intended 
effects precisely because of the inability to anticipate the emergent properties 
of practices.  
 
Thinking in terms of governmentality has several significant consequences 
relating to issues of regions, regional policies and regional devolution. The 
first relates to the constitution of the objects, subjects and spaces of 
government. For example, regional economies are constituted via regional 
statistics, which have a key role in ‘making economies visible’ and constituting 
them as objects for policy action. Secondly, Latour (1987, 237-40) 
emphasises the key role of “centres of calculation”, critical nodes in which 
information on distant objects is brought together, compared, combined, and 
aggregated via use of mathematical and statistical techniques, thereby 
enabling government to ”act at a distance” on objects, such as regions, of its 
programmes and policies. Thirdly, it highlights “the specific mechanisms, 
procedures and tactics assembled and deployed as particular programmes 
are materialised” (MacKinnon, 2000, 295) and through which governmental 
programmes are activated and put into practice. Particular techniques and 
practices become governmental because they can be made practical, 
transformed into concrete devices for managing and directing reality. 
Inscription (for example, writing down agreed quantitative targets for regional 
economic growth) and calculation are key technologies, enabling “enclosure” 
to be breached by “responsibilising” and disciplining actors to the claims of 
central authority (Rose, 1996). These technologies render reality “stable, 
mobile, comparable, combinable”, enabling government to act on it (Rose, 
and Miller, 1992, 185).  
 
Such moves are not unproblematic, however. For example, there are tensions 
between decentralisation to regions and the development of new managerial 
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technologies at national level to “steer” the activities of regional agencies and 
ensure that they deliver national policy objectives. Regional spaces become 
simultaneously objects and subjects of national government, and via “the 
combination of flexibility and standardisation (that is, different levels, same 
targets)  … gives governmental technologies their utility as instruments for 
managing space” (MacKinnon, 2000, 309). However, granting a degree of 
autonomy to enable regions to become political subjects also creates the 
possibility of enclosure, an empowering capacity to resist the intentions of 
central government towards those regions as objects of its policies and create 
capacity for the elaboration of alternative regional projects, indicative of the 
more general contradictory tendencies that plague state policies.  
 
 
The case of north east England: the construction of a region 
and the campaign for devolution  
 
Historical antecedents: constructing a new governmentality and the 
construction of north east England as a region in the 1920s and 1930s  
 
Over a period of less than twenty years, capitalist interests succeeded in 
bringing about two critical and related developments: the definition of the north 
east as a region, and as a particular sort of ‘problem region’; and the shaping 
of emergent forms of state policy to address those problems, the transition 
from a liberal to interventionist mode of regulation as an integral part of 
creating a new governmentality regarding relationships between capital and 
the state and the objects of state policy (Carney and Hudson, 1978; Hudson 
1989; Hudson, 2005). Major firms based in the region devised clear political 
strategies to create and seek to administer new forms of state policy to 
underpin their interests and to enroll other key social forces in the region – 
notably major trades unions – into a project that was represented as being 
(allegedly) in the regional interest, as serving the interests of all people 
resident in the region rather than simply specific private interests. 
Furthermore, this was a shift in the dominant conception of governemtality 
that was to have wider consequences as regions became the objects of 
specific central government  regional policies.  
 
The dominant mode of regulation in the north east in the four decades from 
the 1870s was firmly grounded in liberal politics that gave primacy to the 
market as a resource allocation mechanism, asserted the common interest of 
“masters and men”  and restricted the role of the state to the establishment, 
maintenance and regulation of markets (Moore, 1974). Liberal paternalism 
and an elaborate set of rewards and sanctions helped moderate, Liberal men 
to become and remain trade union leaders. However, these arrangements 
came under pressure from the mid's 1880s. Increasingly, the existing mode of 
regulation became untenable, as the practices of governmentality in which it 
was grounded became fragile and contested.  
 
These pressures intensified in the depression of the 1920s. Most of the main 
branches of economic activity in the Great Northern Coalfield were 
inter-connected via varied forms of inter-firm collaboration that tied companies 
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into interlocking coal combines, with  the bulk of their capital ’fixed’' within the 
region (Carney et al, 1977; Hudson, 1989)3. This profoundly restricted their 
attempts to cope with the slump and depression of the inter-war period. From 
1921 the boom conditions that had prevailed for several years suddenly 
evaporated, especially in key sectors of the regional economy dependent 
upon export markets, such as coal, steel and  shipbuilding, affecting all the 
main companies in the region. The majority of combine interests reacted in 
the same way. Locked into a liberal governmentality, the problem as they saw 
it was that the war had “distorted 'normal trade”, while the solution lay in 
restoring the previous mode of regulation, cutting wages and raising the 
number of hours worked.  This policy was relentlessly implemented, resulting 
in chronic mass unemployment. In the Liberal world this could only happen 
because the cuts were not severe enough. Thus the failure of the policy in 
practice resulted in its intensification.  
 
However, these failures were accompanied by an active search for 'new' 
solutions appropriate to the new conditions, especially after the general strike 
of 1926 when the dangers to social stability of single-minded wage cutting 
were amply demonstrated (especially to non-coal combine capitalist interests: 
Gilbert,1976, Chapters 10 and 11). A variety of policy innovations was 
explored but, in practice, made things worse. Influential members of combines 
in the north east were appalled at the damage done to their interests 
(economic and political) by the failures of both the old mode of regulation and 
the politics of reaction that these failures set in motion in the 1920s.  
 
By the early 1930s the liberal mode of regulation and the conception of 
governmentality in which it was embedded were shattered but it was unclear 
as to what might replace them. By the mid-1930s, however, there was 
evidence of an emergent alternative governmentality and a considerable 
commitment in the north east to search for a new mode of regulation and 'new 
policies', to explore the possibilities for capital in selective state intervention 
and protectionism to defend “regional interests”. From an early stage, 
Chambers of Commerce had begun to explore policy options that pre-figured 
a change in the dominant mode of regulation in the region (and beyond), 
seeking to attract inward investment to the area and seeing increase state 
involvement as part of the solution rather than as a problem. Since  the capital 
represented in the Chambers was mainly tied up within the region, they 
realised the possibilities of representing their problems as a regional problem 
and seeking to resolve them as such. The companies comprising the 
combines could argue the need to ensure that conditions for continued capital 
accumulation in the region were reproduced, while representing this as in the 
regional interest. Consequently, they sought to construct a new 
                                                 
3 Harvey (1917) coined the term ‘coal combine’ to denote capitalist enterprises rooted in the 
‘coal economy’ that had diversified into a wide range of activities. These vertically integrated 
combines were linked into oligopolistic groupings that dominated economy and politics in the 
region. In addition, they were connected by non-economic relationships, including those of 
family, friendship, and shared religion. This puts the recent emphasis upon the importance of 
such linkages and “untraded inter-dependencies” (discussed below) into historical context and 
emphasises the dangers of confusing changes in thought about the economy with changes in 
the economy itself (cf. Hall, 1991). . 
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governmentality, incorporating an interventionist mode of regulation that would 
re-define the relationship between capital and state, define the region as an 
object of regional policy, accord a central role to the state in attracting new 
industries and install the representatives of the combines as key actors in the 
new state institutions that would administer the new regional policies.  
 
By the mid-1930s, therefore, combine and allied interests had successfully 
prosecuted a political strategy that made the case for new and radically 
different policies. The establishment of a Commissioner for the Special Areas 
in England and Wales in 1934 signalled that national government accepted 
the need for a major policy shift, defining and representing “Special Areas” as 
objects of state policy. Within the region, the formation, in 1935, of the North 
East Development Board (NEDB) was equally significant. The initial aim of the 
organisation was to allow"... the exchange of opinions and concerted action 
on non-party lines by representatives of a great variety of interests who have 
no other common meeting ground."  As such, the Board sought to broaden 
the class basis of support for the new regional development policies and 
construct it on a regionalist basis. By 1938, its membership included several 
Labour Members of Parliament, many local authority representatives and 
several trade unionists and members of the Industrial Advisory Council as the 
NEDB claimed the right to speak for the region and promote its interests. 
 
The NEDB was wound up, probably in 1940, but the policy that it had 
tentatively adopted was elaborated in 1943 by the same industrial interests 
and employers, together with some major trade unionists who had been 
imvolved in the NEDB's activities, coming together as the Northern Industrial 
Group (NIG). The Group was formed to discuss the problems that would arise 
on the “reconversion” of the regional economy from a war-time to a 
peace-time economy. Their discussions resulted in the circulation of a draft 
document to other employers and trade unionists which, after further 
discussion was published as "Considerations Affecting PostWar Employment 
in the North East", revealing a clear continuity with, but amplification of, the 
policies and views expressed in the 1930s.  
 
This publication set out an elaborate programme around which all the 
signatories had sunk their differences in the regional interest. It made it clear 
that the Group accepted that state intervention would be necessary for the 
short-period “'reconversion” of the regional economy to peace-time production 
and that such intervention ought to occur and be instrumental in achieving 
economic and social ends, not least by attracting inward investment to 
diversify the economy and help guarantee “full employment” in the region and 
the stem out-migration from it. The Group clearly welcomed enhanced state 
intervention in the economic and social life of the region and had a clear view 
as to the form that this intervention ought to take, based upon the wartime 
experience of its members who had held positions of executive power in the 
state apparatus. These experiences further eroded the “old” liberal opposition 
to state involvement in economy and society and increased support for the 
transition to an interventionist mode of regulation of the economic and social 
life in the region. This remarkable shift from the old “Liberal” fear of state 
intervention, with capital calling for a new interventionist mode of regulation, 
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reflected the confidence of its private sector proponents that they could shape 
the activities of the state to their own requirements while representing these 
as in the general regional interest. 
 
The NIG elaborated its position in its November 1944 "Memorandum on the 
Government White Paper on Employment Policy”, setting out its policy as to 
how the proposed 'Development Areas' should be administered. The White 
Paper suggested that in Development Areas there would be regionally 
organised branches of central Government Departments concerned with 
industrial location policy. The Group Memorandum responded to these 
proposals as follows: "We would like to emphasise strongly that success 
depends upon quick decision and that this will not be obtained unless the 
various Government Departments in Whitehall delegate full authority to their 
regional representatives...". However, this administrative decentralisation 
would be ineffective unless other changes were made. The Group considered 
it "to be of vital importance that the Government regional organisation should 
have effective executive responsibility" and that such an organisation should 
"... maintain close contact with and be advised by a parallel group 
representing employers, employees and other interests in the area. The 
Northern Industrial Group and the North East Development Association 
because of their widely representative character and the work which they are 
already carrying out, can advise in many ways any Government regional 
organisation which may be established" (NIG, 1944, 11, my emphasis). This 
remarkable change in the conception of the most appropriate governmentality 
and new mode of regulation, incorporating an enhanced form of devolution to 
the region, clearly reflected the perception by the NIG that it had successfully 
prosecuted political strategies that secured the interests of private capital in 
the north east, and had succeeded in defining these as synonymous with the 
general regional interest. The enrolment of trades union leaders and Labour 
Members of Parliament into the coalition reflected their perception, grounded 
in a reformist Labourist politics, that this offered the best (or perhaps more 
accurately least bad and only possible) option of securing employment for 
their members and constituents. Seeking to create a sense of a shared 
regional interest involved attempting to ensure that the “spatial reaches” of 
economic, political and cultural processes coalesced to form the boundaries of 
the region – or at least were widely perceived to do so – conferring a 
distinctive and shared north eastern identity to those that lived within these 
common boundaries. Moreover, this establishment of a cross-class regionalist 
project had an enduring effect over the next sixty years of development 
policies in and for the region. It can be seen as the predecessor of a 
succession of regional plans and development strategies, grounded in a 
cross-class consensus as to what was ‘good for the region’, and administered 
by the ‘usual suspects’ within the state, private sector companies and 
organisations and the trades unions, typically male and middle aged (for 
example, see Hudson, 1989; Robinson et al. 2000).  
 
Crucially, however, these remained regionalisations of central government 
policies and initiatives, an administrative devolution rather than one that 
devolved the power to act, the power to decide on policy and commensurate 
resources to enable regional organisations to implement their policy choices 
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(see Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2003). In so far as business concerns in the 
region felt that they were able to secure their interests via these arrangements 
they were content to rest with administrative devolution, as were those in the 
local political elites and dominant strata who were content with these 
arrangements – not least as they helped secure their own power and 
influence within the region. However, the lack of political devolution and 
meaningful transfer of powers and resources to make policy and decisions 
within the region continued to rankle with other regional politicians and 
fractions of political strata in the region. 
 
 
Sixty years on: contemporary arguments for regional devolution, 
enabling myths and regional economic success stories 
 
In the introductory section of the paper recent years, I briefly summarised the 
arguments underpinning the recent resurgence of interest within the region in 
regional devolution and an elected Regional Assembly and central 
government’s enthusiasm for such devolution. In this section I focus in greater 
depth on the critical enabling myth that underpinned this case: that regional 
economic revival and a reduction in the “economic deficit” of the English 
regions would follow from regional political devolution as a mechanism to 
address the “democratic deficit”.  
 
As the previous section makes clear, there is a long history of ineffective 
central state regional polices that have failed to address the economic 
development problems of the north east and of cross-class regionalist 
solutions to the “problems of the north east region”, which made it fertile 
ground for more recent devolutionist arguments and claims. There is no doubt 
that the prime stimulus to the recent resurgence of interest in regional 
devolution lies in studies of regional economic ‘success stories’ in the latter 
part of the twentieth century – which are well known so that there is no need 
to rehearse them at length here – of the regions of the Third Italy, Baden-
Württemberg, Silicon Valley and so on that have achieved the so-called ‘high 
road’ to regional economic development. Typically these are characterised as 
‘successful’ economies, in some cases making associated claims that these 
are more egalitarian and equitable forms of capitalist development. The 
stories told about these regions have led to claims – more accurately 
assertions – that regional economic success is based upon two conditions 
that are seen as both necessary and sufficient: first, that of a devolved 
political system, so that regions form a scale or layer in a system of multi-level 
governance; secondly, that the governance system extends beyond the state 
to encompass a range of organisations and institutions located in civil society. 
Together, these state and non-state institutions interact and coalesce to form 
supportive and enabling regional institutional formations, registered in 
concepts such as ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin and Thrift, 1994), ‘untraded 
interdependencies’ (Storper, 1995) or ‘learning regions’ (Morgan, 1995). It is 
claimed that the ‘old’ top-down state policies of regional development, which 
treated regions as objects of central state polices, to be governed and 
managed ‘at a distance’, have become obsolete in the context of a neo-liberal 
globalising economy. Consequently, in order to be economically successful in 
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this new world regions must become pro-active subjects responsibility for their 
own developmental trajectory and fate rather than simply passive objects of 
central state policies. Moreover the role of the central state is to recognise 
and facilitate this by devolving power and resources to regions as political 
actors (Hadjimichais and Hudson, 2003). 
 
This has led to normative claims that other regions, especially marginalized 
and peripheral regions such as north east England, must become part of 
devolved political systems and develop such regionally-specific organisational 
and institutional formations if they are to improve their economic fortunes. For 
some this is simply a necessary condition, recognising that regions remain 
open constructions subjects to a variety of externally originating forces. For 
other, however, necessity slides into sufficiency and leads to regionalist 
claims that regional devolution guarantees regional economic success, based 
upon a simplistic causal model but legitimated and given credibility by appeals 
to what then becomes the ‘enabling myths’ of the ‘re-organisation of the state’ 
thesis and a particular and partial interpretation of ‘regional success stories’. 
 
However, before going any further it is important to enter an important caveat 
about these ‘success stories’. Whilst some herald them as egalitarian and 
progressive developmental models, others see them in a very different light,. 
For example, Hadjimichalis and Papamichos (1990) argue that the ‘economic 
success’ of much of the Third Italy was grounded in regressive gender 
divisions of labour and patriarchal arrangement that forced women and 
children to carry out work for long hours, sometimes through the night, in poor 
working conditions. Often the basis of profitability was the exploitation of 
immigrant labour. Similarly it is worth recalling that in regions such as Baden-
Württemberg over 10% of the labour force were gastarbeiter, typically on 
fixed-term contracts renewable (or not) on an annual basis. This hardly 
smacks of a socially progressive developmental model to be emulated 
elsewhere. Indeed, the recent (2004) industrial unrest in Baden-Württemberg, 
especially in the automobile plants of Chrysler-Daimler,  is indicative of the 
limits to such a developmental model. 
 
This in turn reminds us of the need to be cautious and critical in the way the 
‘regions’ and ‘regional success’ are conceptualised and presented. Clearly, as 
noted above, there has been a considerable debate about this in recent years. 
But it is important to emphasise that regions are social constructions, not 
natural entities. Equally, the criteria against which ‘success’ is to be gauged 
are social and political constructions. As such, different social groups and 
fractions seek to claim the right to speak ‘for the region’, to define ‘success’ in 
particular ways, and typically in the process seek to present a sectional or 
particularistic interest as ‘the regional interest’. Thus those who seek to argue 
for ‘regional devolution’ typically do not do so in a disinterested way or in a 
way that seeks to promote some universal ‘regional interest’ but as part of a 
strategy to advance particular interests as ‘the regional interest’. For example, 
fractions of the political strata see regional devolution and devolved regional 
institutions as a way of promoting particular political projects and interests 
while others seek to oppose them precisely because they would be inimical to 
their interests. Nor is this a new process. For example, as illustrated above, in 
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the 1930s representatives of major capitalist interest in north east England 
sought to construct a particular representation of the region as ‘problematic’ 
and of state policy solutions to address these problems precisely as a way of 
seeking to protect and promote their own interests as owners of capital. 
 
 
Reflecting on the case of the north east in the light of 
contemporary conceptual debates 
 
Regional devolution and concepts of power  
 
It is possible to interpret regional devolution to north east England in terms of 
all three concepts of power outlined above. All help in understanding; none 
alone provides a full understanding. From one perspective that can be linked 
with some realist readings of power -  what we might term the ‘fallacy of the 
lump of power’ -  this can be seen in terms of an essential and finite ‘lump of 
power’, some of which can be devolved from the central (national) state to 
regions. In short, there is a finite quantity of power that can be cut up and 
allocated between various levels of the state apparatus. Power thus remains 
centred in the state but is re-allocated as between the regional, national and 
supra-national scales, as registered in two of the three dimensions of 
Jessop’s ‘re-organisation of the state’ thesis (Jessop, 1997). Thus ‘power’ can 
be taken from the central state and devolved to regions.  
 
However, the decision to devolve is one that is taken by the national state 
centrally while the causal effectivity of state power at regional scale is only 
ever contingently realised. In particular, its realisation depends upon: first, the 
relationships between regional and central scales of the state; secondly, the 
relationship between state and non-state governance organisations, 
especially in the context of the region. Moreover, typically in the regional 
‘success stories’ the role of the central state is critical in underpinning regional 
economic success, in a variety of ways, although this tends to be 
systematically ignored or denied by those who wish to assert the efficacy of 
the region as social actor and facilitator – if not primary causal factor - of 
regional economic success. The issue then is much more the form of the 
relationship between the national and regional scales of the state in enabling 
regional economic success rather in some sense taking power from the 
central state apparatuses and giving it to regions that then act autonomously.  
 
From another perspective, power can be seen in network terms, building on 
the long history of collaboration between social classes and groups within the 
region around a regional agenda. However, it is important to remember that 
such networks, characterised by asymmetrical power relations within them, 
pre-date social scientists thinking about governance and policy in network 
terms (Hadjimichalis and Hudson, 2003) Thirdly, it can be interpreted in 
Foucauldian terms of micro-circuits of power widely diffused within civil 
society, economy and state, but with the national state retaining a key 
privileged macro-scale role; decisions as to what to devolve, what targets 
devolved regional government must meet continue to be decided in the 
centre.  
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However, the key issue is not so much that of the relative merits of alternative 
conceptions of power but the practical question of the capability to create sites 
and sources of power within the region that would allow a more meaningful 
determination of the region’s development trajectory, ‘in and for itself’ – 
assuming, for the moment that a singular conception of ‘the regional interest’ 
could be constructed and sustained. Should that assumption prove untenable, 
however, the issues relating to power and the ability of different social classes 
and groups within the region to realise their interests must be problematised. 
 
Towards a fuller critique of regional devolution, regional planning and 
regional strategies  in north east England 
 
For some thirty years, the post-war history of north east England epitomised a 
belief in planning, in state-influenced industrial modernisation as the route to 
full employment and social progress. The region’s developmental trajectory 
was heavily influenced by external decisions – not just those of private capital 
but even more so the central state and its policies (allegedly) ‘for the region’. 
The region was uniquely positioned at the intersection of national, sectoral 
and regional modernisation policies in the 1960s. But 'planning' in this context 
meant at best a weak form of 'indicative planning' - a mixture of carrot and 
stick, through which the state attempted to persuade or bribe private capital to 
behave in certain ways. There were only limited controls on private capital, 
and certainly no powers to make private capital do anything other than what it 
perceived to be in its best interests. Where there was formal state control, via 
nationalisation, things were little better and expansionist plans very soon 
became translated into uncoordinated plant closures, job cuts and crisis man-
agement. In addition, the spectacular failure of 1960s modernisation policies 
had other effects. The continuing failure of central state regional policies for 
the region adequately to address economic development problems of the 
region helped open up space for alternative issues to be put on the regional 
political agenda, including that of regional devolution. 
 
I have argued above that ideas of regionally-based coalitions and policies are 
deeply imbued into the consciousness of key decision makers and social 
actors in north east England. As a result, when the basis of one consensus 
based on a social democratic politics and regional planning was eroded, a 
new one grounded more in neoliberalism and adaptive regional strategies 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Significantly, the new consensus is much 
more authoritarian in character, with the interests of labour given at best token 
representation. The policies of the Regional Development Agency created in 
1999 are strongly shaped by business interests – and this is clearly one 
reason for the opposition of business leaders in the north east to the proposed 
elected Regional Assembly, which would take responsibility for the regional 
development agenda and management of the regional economy. As the 
Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott recently put it in discussing the RDAs: 
“We made them business-led. We represented their interests and what they 
are fighting to keep now is the RDAs” (cited in Blitz and Tighe, 2004). 
 
Such devolution and an elected Regional Assembly therefore might well lead 
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to more democratic decision making and could enhance economic prospects. 
However, devolution and regionalist solutions leave untouched - unasked, let 
alone answered - a number of crucial questions. Of these, the most funda-
mental is how a regionalist solution would confront multinational capital in a 
neo-liberalising economy and greatly expanded European Union as well as a 
national state that for all its emphasis on a ‘Third Way’ remains firmly rooted 
in a neo-liberal economic policy in such a way as to reconstruct the region’s 
economy and progressively to transform its social relations of production and 
reproduction. This latter has been and remains the pivotal issue (Beynon and 
Hudson, 1993). 
 
As the most recent Index of Multiple Deprivation data (ODPM, 2004b) make 
dramatically clear, much of the north east is blighted by very high levels of 
multiple, deprivation. Actively addressing the needs of most people living in 
the north east, but in particular those of its most disadvantaged residents, 
would necessitate going beyond a degree of constitutional reform directly to 
confront questions of power and control over the production and distribution of 
goods and services. In this, the relationship between private capital and the 
institutions of central, regional and local government would need to be 
examined, as would their relationship to dominant social groupings in the 
region. For a few years in the 1950s and 1960s it looked as if the interests of 
big capital, the state and a majority of working people and their families could 
be made to seem compatible in the region, but it soon became clear that this 
was an illusion. Attempts to persuade private capital to behave in line with the 
projections of state indicative plans were a dismal failure. From many points 
of view nationalisation proved just as – if not more - disastrous for the north 
east. This is not to argue that public ownership per se should be rejected but 
rather to acknowledge that the particular form adopted - in particular the 
nationalised industry - ought to be. Rather than becoming a mechanism for 
more rational industrial planning advancing the interests of the majority of the 
population of workers and consumers, nationalised industries became state-
controlled companies promoted a savage form of restructuring that paid scant 
regard to the sensitivities of people in their places. Equally, however, to argue 
that all economic planning - in the ex-ante sense of making decisions about 
the allocation of output ahead of production - is rendered impossible by the 
deepening of the social divisions of labour to the point where this takes on 
causal powers independent, and beyond the reach, of the social relations of 
production (Sayer and Walker, 1992, pp. 224-30) is overly pessimistic. To 
dismiss all alternatives to an ex-post validation of production via the market 
simply because of the collapse of the command economies of the USSR and 
its former Eastern European satellite states is to go too far. History in this 
sense is not yet at an end. There may well be feasible possibilities for more 
rational economic planning that are sensitive to the specificities of regions 
such as north east England – especially if there is some re-conceptualisation 
of ‘the economy’ and what it denotes. Certainly, discovering and constructing 
them remains a task to be undertaken but that is a very different matter from 
an a priori ruling of such possibilities from the agenda.  
 
However, as of now they are very far from that agenda and there is no point in 
denying this – indeed to do so would carry grave political dangers. The switch 
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from an emphasis on (albeit weak indicative) regional planning to regional 
strategies (ONE NorthEast, 1999) is more than simply semantic. Above all, it 
registers the dominance of a neo-liberal governmentality in which the best that 
can be imagined for regions such as the north east is to ride with the tide of 
neo-liberal globalisation, and seek to adapt the region to capture some mobile 
capital investment and low grade, poorly qualified jobs in competition with 
other regions (and cities and national territories) globally on the low road to 
regional development .  
 
The political strategies of the last sixty years in and for the north east have 
prioritised the interests of big capital and central government over those of 
local communities, local people, workers and their families. If the interests of 
the latter are to be prioritised, then a very major change in political priorities 
will be required. This may involve a greater degree of regional devolution as a 
necessary condition but certainly would require much more than just 
devolution, not least in the spatial formation of politics in the UK and the UK 
state (Amin et al, 2003). Attempts to create networked forms of power ‘in and 
for’ the region have been shown to be inadequate in seeking to confront the 
structural power of capital and the structural imperative upon the national 
state to subordinate interests located within the region to the national interest 
and the dependency of the state upon the accumulation process. Indeed, th 
construction of networked forms of power in the region has both reflected and 
reinforced the position of hose possessing structural power rather than 
empowering the multitude in the region. The issue therefore is not whether 
devolved government can create power ‘in and for’ the region but the limits 
that the relationships between capital, the state and civil society impose upon 
the scope and content of state activity – whether at national or regional scale 
– and the interests that are prioritised in state policy agendas as the state 
seeks to navigate the perilous path between the dangers of accumulation and 
legitimation crises.  
 
There is no doubt that a minority in the region, predominantly drawn from 
particular political strata and social classes, would continue to deploy the 
rhetorical devices of “the region” and “its interests” as a way of protecting and 
promoting their interests. There is a long history of this and no doubt it would 
continue to be the case were there to be an elected Regional Assembly and 
more devolved forms of regional governing. Whether much would change for 
the better for the vast majority of people living in the region remains a moot 
point. At a minimum, prioritising the interests of the vast majority of people in 
the north east would involve establishing a different conception of planning, 
and effecting a radical change in socio-economic priorities and in the mode of 
regulation and dominant governmentality. Whether this is feasible remains, at 
best, an open question. It may well be, to borrow Offe’s (1975) evocative 
phrase, the case that the impossible may be necessary and the necessary 
impossible in terms of creating powers and resources at regional level that 
would allow an effective determination of the regional economic development 
trajectories that challenged the imperatives of capital accumulation. Maybe it 
is no longer feasible even to think of national, or even supranational, 
regulatory regimes which would allow effective planning via effective influence 
over, let alone control of, private capital's (dis)investment decisions, and even 
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less the socialisation of key sectors of the economy. Perhaps there is no 
effective alternative to the disciplinary powers of the market and the law of 
value in determining the fate the regions – for better or, almost certainly, 
worse. If so, it is better, though painful, to recognise this so that people in 
areas such as the north east can better understand the sort of future they face 
and make their choices accordingly and not raise yet more false hopes on the 
back of devolutionist assertions and claims about transferring power to the 
region.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The main conclusions of this paper can be summarised as follows. First, there 
are many good reasons to support regional devolution, such as increased 
accountability and transparency in political decision-making. Even so, it 
remains unclear as to the extent to which this would involve devolving power 
to the region and what this would translate to in terms of progressive 
developmental policies and transparent and accountable decision making. 
Secondly, and critically, regional devolution is unlikely to lead to regional 
economic success in the north east – and indeed in other peripheralised 
regions, especially if economic success continues to be defined via the 
parameters of the formal mainstream capitalist economy (such as profitability 
and share-holder value). If such peripheralised and marginalised regional 
economies are to be revived and regenerated, this will require a lot more than 
simply some limited devolution of political power within the structures of the 
state and systems of multi-level and multi-scalar governing. It remains an 
open question as to the extent to which this would be possible, precisely 
because they have been peripheralised as a consequence of the inner 
dynamic of capital accumulation and the combined and uneven character that 
the capitalist form of economic development necessarily and unavoidably 
assumes. However, regional economic success does not necessarily equate 
with socially inclusive and equitable development. Thirdly, on the other hand, 
a failure to appreciate that there is no necessary causal relationship between 
regional devolution and regional economic success may well seriously 
weaken the case for regional devolution, which on other grounds may be 
something to welcome. Therefore there are manifest political dangers in 
pinning the argument for regional devolution to the mast of ‘regional economic 
success’. This is only likely to lead – once again - to unrealised expectations 
and disappointment, discrediting the concept of devolution per se and cutting 
the ground from beneath the other to be welcomed ways in which the concept 
of greater political devolution and regional accountability could enhance life in 
peripheral regions. Fourthly, there is a need for eternal vigilance to guard 
against the danger of allowing the pursuit of the Holy Grail of regional 
economic renewal and revival via regional devolution to become the ‘enabling 
myth’ through which the central state shifts the blame onto the victim for the 
continuing economic problems of regions such as north east England. Finally, 
there is a need to recognise the limits to devolution of power within the formal 
political system in order to open up space in which to explore more radical 
alternatives.  
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This re-thinking would need to encompass at least five dimensions. First, re-
thinking the economy, and recognising that this embraces much more than 
formal mainstream market economy. Secondly, re-thinking development so 
as, for example, to give much more weight to issues such as health and well-
being. Thirdly, re-thinking appropriate forms of politics, to explore more 
participatory forms of democratic practice, more open and transparent fora for 
political decision making beyond as well as within the formal structures of 
party politics. Fourthly, recognising the limits to the regional, and insisting that 
the national state continues to acknowledge its responsibilities for the social 
and economic well-being of its citizens, wherever they live. However, the state 
apparatus cannot be simply ‘captured’ to address the needs of the mass of 
the region’s population. The key issue then becomes the architecture of the 
system of governing and the relations between the regional and national 
within, but also beyond, the structures of the state. Finally, re-thinking the 
region to escape the limitations of the myth of a unified (and unifying) regional 
interest and explicitly acknowledge the existence of different – and at times 
openly competitive, grounded in different class structural positions and 
sources of power – interests held by individuals and social groups living in the 
same space, Within such an agonistic politics, which interests prevailed and 
which were prioritised in state policy agendas would be the outcome of overtly 
political struggle based on a recognition of legitimate difference – albeit a 
difference often grounded in structurally asymmetrical power relations - rather 
than a presumption of homogeneity of interest on the basis of a shared 
regional identity. 
 
 
Postscript 
 
Some months after this paper was written and shortly after the Roskilde 
conference, the proposals for an elected Regional Assembly in northeast 
England were decisively rejected in early November 2004 by almost 4 to 1, 
with a surprisingly high turn-out (over 47%) in the referendum – although still 
with only a minority of those eligible to do so actually voting. For whatever 
reasons, this was a decisive rejection of the proposals on offer and triggered a 
lively debate as to the reasons for this rejection. 
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